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RUSSIA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY PROBLEM 
As much after the Soviet collapse as before it, the "Russian Problem" remains Europe's 
single biggest security issue. The collapse of the Soviet Union did, of course, end the 
threat of continental war in Europe, making the world a much safer place. The retreat of 
Soviet power also unmasked a broad range of other security threats  ethnic and nationalist 
conflicts; unstable governments and concomitant crime and terrorism; unrest due to 
economic collapse; and a power vacuum in East-Central Europe. Yet it is Russia itself 
that has dominated the attention of Western policy makers, and for good reason: it is 
Russia's attitude toward these issues, and toward the West in general, which will have the 
most decisive impact in shaping the political atmosphere in Europe in the coming years.  
What is under debate is how to understand what the Russian Problem is. Three decades 
ago, Ralf Dahrendorf formulated the German Question, with all of its foreign policy 
implications, as primarily one of political ideology: "Why is it that so few in Germany 
embraced the principle of liberal democracy?"1 The Russian Problem can usefully be 
formulated in similar terms. While the Russian Problem is, as the German Question was, 
expressed largely in aggressive foreign policies, it is not merely an issue of the particular 
policy choices of Russian leaders. Nor, in spite of the suggestion of "Realist" scholars, is 
the Russian Problem the inevitable result of Russian power; that power could be used in 
less disruptive ways. Russia's historic backwardness contributes to the problem, but is not 
the core of the issue. Rather, the key motivating force which ties these phenomena 
together is the way Russians see their national identity.2 Thus, the Russian Problem can 
be summed up in the question: Why have so many in Russia continued to conceive their 
national identity in ways that threaten their neighbors?  
The view that contributes most to Russian aggressiveness asserts that Russia is in essence 
a multinational gathering of peoples  or, to put it less charitably, an empire  and has been 
so ever since Ivan the Terrible annexed the Tatar kingdoms in the 1550s. For those who 
take this view, the worth of the Russian people is expressed in their state's power, and 
they see no natural boundaries for its expression. In this way of thinking, Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky's vision of Russian soldiers washing their boots in the Indian Ocean is 
clearly preferable to liberal Atlanticists' effort at drawing a border on the featureless 
steppes where the current Russian Federation meets Kazakhstan; or to Russian 
geostrategists' attempt to defend Russia's borders in the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan.  
Another approach to Russia's identity problem proposes a moral or ideological mission 
for Russia. In early Tsarist times, Russian Orthodox clerics saw Russia as the Third 
Rome, the center of Christian purity in the world, with a mandate to proselytize its unique 
moral vision. In the nineteenth century, the "Slavophiles" revived this approach, while 
the "Westernizers" proposed a new mission for Russia, a mission civilisatrice to promote 
Western civilization in Eurasia. The peculiarly Russian quality about the latter idea was 
less its specific content than its extravagant idealism, requiring as it did a complete 
rejection of Russia's past. Today, the heirs of the Westernizers are reviving this idea, 
proposing that Russia be the democratizer of Eurasia. But as attractive as this vision may 
appear from the West, it requires the abandonment of the tens of millions of the Russian 
diaspora  not an attractive prospect to most Russians. At best, building a democracy in 
Russia will require a long-term, inglorious effort which may well not be what the Russian 
people want.  
A third approach to Russia's identity problem is the nationalist or Slavophile approach, 
which puts Russia at the head of the family of Orthodox Slavic nations in Europe. 
Though many people confuse Russian nationalism with imperialism, the ideas are 
distinct: nationalists want to establish an ethnic Russian or East Slavic nation-state 
excluding Russia's non-Slavic neighbors; imperialists want to rule those neighbors. The 
trouble with the nationalist view is that it inevitably opens the door to ethnonationalist 
chauvinism. The minimal nationalist program requires the annexation of Russified areas 
on Russia's borders, such as eastern Ukraine and northeastern Kazakhstan. The 
Slavophile vision requires the annexation of those entire countries, and Belarus as well. 
The position of national minorities can only be tenuous in such a Russia: other Slavs are 
"little brothers," while non-Slavs are essentially foreigners.  
More to the point, ethnically-defined nationalism works as much exclusively as 
inclusively: the nation defines itself against others. If Russia chooses the Slavophile path, 
Samuel Huntington's nightmare of a "Clash of Civilizations" could become a reality, with 
Russia at the head of Europe's Orthodox Slavs, aligned either against Russia's Muslim 
Turkic neighbors, or against the West, or both.3 Indeed, Russian academics  and not only 
nationalists and Slavophiles  are fascinated by Huntington's idea.4 The similarity between 
the Bosnian imbroglios of 1914 and 1994 provides a hint of the horrors that await Europe 
down that path.  
In short, how Russia defines its national identity affects everyone else in Europe. An 
imperialist Russia must expand or rot; a Slavophile Russia is by definition irredentist; and 
a democratic Russia must, for the medium-term, remain unstable. In any of these cases, 
the result is unavoidably a security dilemma for both Russia and its neighbors: Russia's 
size and goals make it threatening, while its backwardness and instability make it feel 
threatened. How this dilemma is handled will have a powerful influence on how Russians 
address their identity problem in the twenty-first century  and how much of a threat they 
will pose to the rest of Europe.  
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
The idea of national identity is a complex one, and has given rise to an enormous and 
growing literature.5 For the purposes of this article three points from that literature are 
crucial. First, national identity is created: a nation is, in Benedict Anderson's memorable 
phrase, an "imagined community." Consequently, the intellectuals who create national 
identity have alternatives for shaping or reshaping that identity  though they are 
constrained by the willingness of their would-be countrymen to accept the identity they 
suggest. Finally, in a world of nation-states, national identity defines not only the political 
community, but also the state: the political legitimacy of a government depends on its 
association with national identity, and its political character is determined by the nature 
of the nationalist ideology its people accept.6  
Historically, Russians have attempted to blend all three approaches outlined above  the 
imperialist, the idealist, and the nationalist  in conceptualizing their identity. In the 
nineteenth century, that attempt was summed up in the legitimizing slogan "Autocracy, 
Orthodoxy, Nationality." The blend, however, was self-contradictory: the Orthodox faith 
was being used to justify autocracy  i.e., imperialism  over Catholic Poles, Protestant 
Finns, and Muslim Tatars, while the solidarity of Orthodox Slavs was promoted as the 
"national" basis of the empire. This formula could hold the empire's disparate peoples 
together only if they accepted Russification and the Orthodox religion. But they would 
not: after a millenium of religious conflict, the Russian Empire's Muslims, Catholics, 
Protestants and Jews were largely immune to pressures to Russify  as, it turned out, were 
most Ukrainians.  
When the Bolsheviks came to power, they reformulated the old ideas, trying to create a 
new Soviet identity for the peoples they ruled. They rejected the mystical, millenial 
Orthodox religious justification for autocracy and empire, replacing it with a mystical, 
millenial communist ideological justification. They resolved the logical contradictions in 
the old Tsarist policy by subordinating nationalism to imperialism, and by subordinating 
both to ideology.7 The new Soviet communist identity was open to everyone. The trouble 
was that none of the Soviet nations  including the Russian nation  was satisfied with the 
subordination of their identity to the rapidly tarnishing ideal of Soviet man.  
By the time Gorbachev became Soviet leader, the communist ideological justification for 
Soviet policy was dead, so most Russians had fallen back on a less complicated 
imperialist way of thinking. The entire Soviet Union was their country, they felt, not just 
Russia.8 The complete economic integration of the Soviet republics and the dominance of 
the Russian language in most of them made this view credible. Russians felt at home 
anywhere in the union, and they vastly underestimated the resentment their dominance 
caused among the other Soviet nationalities. Russians viewed foreign policy in simple 
nineteenth century sphere-of-influence terms; if the Soviet claims about bringing progress 
through spreading communism were not wholly accurate, neither were American claims 
to be spreading democracy. The Soviet Union's role was to maintain the balance of power 
and prevent unchecked "American aggression."  
Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" tried to change all that, essentially from the 
imperialist to the moralist approach. Instead of thinking in balance of power terms that 
they must oppose the West, Gorbachev's reformist ideologues proposed a focus on 
cooperating with the West to promote "universal human values."9 Harking back to 
images of Russian moral purity, Gorbachev cast himself as the apostle of peace and 
disarmament against the militarist industrialists driving Ronald Reagan's policy of arms 
racing. Russia, Gorbachev tried to argue, was the advocate of arms reduction, human 
rights improvements and environmental protection.  
Eventually, Gorbachev extended this humanitarian ethic to a restructuring of the Soviet 
Union itself. Once the dimensions of the nationality problem became known, Gorbachev 
proposed the recasting of the Soviet Union as a more-or-less voluntary confederation, as 
envisaged in his Union Treaty. This attempt was aborted by the August 1991 coup 
attempt. Gorbachev's enduring effect, however, and one of his stronger claims to 
greatness, was to make humanitarian criteria important in Russian thinking about foreign 
and nationalities policy.  
Boris Yeltsin's first attempt to address the Russian Problem was embodied in the original 
concept of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a sort of democratic Slavic 
confederation of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Yeltsin understood that the idea of 
"sovereignty" for Russia was popular not as a move toward independence from other 
Slavic republics, but as a move toward independence from the despised central 
government of Gorbachev. Thus, when Yeltsin moved to eliminate that central 
government, he did so by creating a bond with the other Slavic republics which he 
considered to be, along with the Russian Federation, part of the greater Russian heartland. 
Yeltsin's vision was impossible: the Central Asian republics were clamoring to join the 
CIS, while Ukraine was determined to emasculate it, so it inevitably evolved toward its 
current, ramshackle form. But the impulse behind the attempt  an impulse that remains 
strong  was a Slavophile as well as a democratic one.  
Today, different views on all three dimensions  ideological, national, and imperial  are 
competing for dominance in Russia's new self-conception. Liberals, clerics and mystics 
compete to define Russia's core ideology. Nationalists, Slavophiles and liberals compete 
to define Russia's nationhood. And all of these groups compete with imperialists to define 
the proper expanse of the Russian state and the proper direction of Russian foreign 
policy. Meanwhile, because of the lack of agreement on Russia's national identity, the 
Russian state lacks a commonly accepted basis for its legitimacy: its borders, both in the 
geographical and the functional sense, are in dispute. Partly as a result, the state itself is 
weak, incoherent, and poorly institutionalized; it cannot become coherent until agreement 
is reached on a national identity to define the state's boundaries and political ideology to 
define its purpose.  
Russian Liberal's Dilemma 
The liberals' core principles are that Russia should continue reforms aimed at 
democratization, market privatization, and an open concept of "Russianness" based on 
citizenship, not ethnicity. If applied in foreign policy, such concepts would lead to the 
conclusion that Russia can and should cooperate with the West, and that it should pursue 
voluntary agreements on integration with the other former Soviet states, rather than 
extracting such agreements coercively. Sophisticated liberals realize that attempts to 
impose nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence do more harm than good to Russian 
interests.10 They also realize that it is not in Russia's best interest to re-integrate the entire 
former Soviet space, arguing that Russian interests in Central Asia, especially, do not 
require closer economic or military ties.11 Most of all, these analysts realize that 
continued Russian democratization and restraint in foreign policy is the best recipe for 
avoiding a new spiral of insecurity in Europe. As Vladimir Lukin, a leader of the 
reformist Yabloko party, has pointed out: "if we don't show that we are continuing on the 
path of democratic development, I think the result will be an acceleration of the process 
of expanding NATO. . . [and] an attempt to eject us from regions in which we still have 
some influence."12  
The problem facing Russian liberals, difficult but not hopeless, is the same one that faced 
their nineteenth-century forerunners, the Westernizers: how can promoting Western 
rationalism find resonance with a Russian public that has neither a Western nor a 
rationalist tradition? Those who try to graft liberal stock onto Russia's traditional 
nationalist root generally end, like Yeltsin's erstwhile ally Ruslan Khasbulatov (a leader 
of the 1993 coup attempt), by jettisoning liberalism altogether and joining the nationalist 
camp.  
The answer to this dilemma is the humanitarian strain Gorbachev tapped in his policy. 
Russia has a deep wellspring of humanitarian impulses founded, as Western liberalism is, 
on the basic concepts of Judeo-Christian morality. The Russian Orthodox church has 
sometimes supported such impulses in politics: during the 1991 coup attempt, for 
example, Patriarch Alexii II sided with Yeltsin, deploying loudspeakers to warn Soviet 
soldiers on the streets that attacking the "White House" would mean committing the 
"horrible sin of fratricide."13 Thus, at its best, Russian liberalism can combine hardheaded 
appeals to Russian interests with emotional appeals to the humanitarian principles which 
have, since Gorbachev's reforms, acted as a real restraining influence in Russian foreign 
policy.  
Nationalists and Slavophiles 
The appeal of the competing nationalist-Slavophile camp is based on its promotion of 
cultural, moral and political unity. The Slavophile variant of this program emphasizes the 
establishment of an Orthodox Slavic state uniting Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and (usually) 
Kazakhstan. The idea has enormous appeal for Russians, even the most liberal of whom 
have trouble accepting that Ukraine  the cradle of Russian civilization in the medieval 
Kievan Rus' period  is really the home of a separate Ukrainian nation.  
Russian Orthodoxy is important for Slavophiles less because it defines their beliefs than 
because it shapes their identity. After seven decades of indoctrination in atheism, few 
Russians proclaim any religious faith. Nevertheless, the idea of religion remains 
important: in one poll, 61 percent of respondents who were not religious believers still 
felt that "religion is essential for the preservation of national identity."14 Being from an 
Orthodox background, in short, helps define the identity even of those Russians who 
never set foot in a church. This tendency powerfully influences Russians' sympathies 
(e.g., for Orthodox Serbs, and against Bosnian Muslims).  
Visions of the exact nature of the projected Slavic state vary among the idea's supporters. 
But even the most territorially limited project, for a Russian national state rather than a 
broader Eastern Slavic one, requires substantial border revisions. Advocates of the 
nation-state idea argue that Russia should exclude Muslim regions such as Chechnya, but 
should annex "large chunks of historically Russian territory," such as the Crimea, eastern 
Ukraine, and northeastern Kazakhstan.15 Slavophiles, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in 
contrast, argue for a more inclusive idea of nationality. In his 1994 speech to the Duma, 
Solzhenitsyn proposed a voluntary union of the three Slavic states and Kazakhstan, a 
revival of the nineteenth-century zemstvo system of local self-government, and a spiritual 
renewal of Russian politics.16  
More extreme Slavophiles add to these ideas an antisemitic bent and a partiality to 
conspiracy theories. One group led by former KGB General Alexander Sterligov and ex-
Army General Valentin Varennikov advocates a "single state based on Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarussia" and "the need for Orthodoxy and a monarchy in Russia," while also 
denouncing "Yids" and imaginary CIA plots.17 The antisemitic ravings of such groups are 
supported by some Orthodox church leaders as well: one Orthodox priest cursed the 
Yeltsin government as "Yid authorities" during the October 1993 coup; and the recently 
deceased Metropolitan of St. Petersburg was circulating the antisemitic forgery, 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion.18  
Imperialist Nostalgia 
The programs of the Slavophiles should be distinguished from those of a separate group, 
the imperialists. The Slavophiles, as noted above, are interested in a spiritual renewal and 
unification primarily of Orthodox Slavs  with varying degrees of unpleasant 
consequences for those in the future Russia who are neither. The imperialists, in contrast, 
are concerned with re-establishing the Soviet-era borders and reasserting Russia's "great 
power status." The crucial difference is that the imperialists want to conquer Russia's 
Muslim neighbors, while the Slavophiles want to exclude them. Slavophiles appeal to 
traditional Russian mysticism; imperialists appeal primarily to Russia's imperial 
nostalgia. Slavophiles are both nationalists (advocates of a state based on a particular 
nationality) and chauvinists (advocates of repressing other groups); imperialists are not 
nationalists (they do not want a nation-state), but are primarily chauvinists (advocating an 
empire in which their group  Russians  dominates).  
This distinction helps to explain the factionalism of the Russian right wing: what seems 
from afar to be a red-brown coalition is in fact a diverse collection of people advocating 
various combinations of nationalism, fascism, communism, imperialism, monarchism, 
mysticism and Slavophilism. These groups disagree about everything from privatizing 
industry to the relative merits of free elections versus dictatorship, not to mention 
Russia's national identity. While Gennady Zyuganov was remarkably successful in 
uniting these people in 1995-96, the internal tensions in his coalition make it constantly 
vulnerable to fracture.  
A purer politics of imperial nostalgia is that of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The core of 
Zhirinovsky's program is the frank construction of empire: first, reduce the autonomy of 
nationalities inside Russia; then incorporate the other former Soviet republics into the 
new, unitary Russian state; and then, finally, the "last thrust south" to conquer 
Afghanistan (as revenge) and Iran.19 The rest of Zhirinovsky's program is a clever 
compilation promising something for everyone  bread (a socialist safety net) and circuses 
(including Zhirinovsky's own performances) for the masses; privatization for the 
"businessmen" and "mafia"; a strong hand to provide order and promote the interests of 
the bureaucracy; and the occasional antisemitic appeal to provide a scapegoat when 
convenient. Nevertheless, inside all of this there is a distinct notion of the identity of the 
Russian: not a "civilized democrat" (the liberal vision) or an Orthodox Slav (the 
Slavophile version), but simply a person who speaks Russian and lords it over those who 
do not. Zhirinovsky's threats about retaking Alaska are symbolic statements of his 
intention to "stand up to the United States."  
The so-called "centrists" of the Russian debate are actually moderate imperialists, 
asserting that the re-establishment of the USSR is "inevitable." These "centrists" do try to 
distinguish themselves from the imperialists: "industrialist" Arkady Volsky and former 
Soviet premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, for example, claim to support a voluntary union 
modelled after the European Union, rather than a true federation.20 The logic of their 
argument is that the former Soviet states are so economically and strategically 
interdependent after centuries of union that re-integration is both necessary and 
inevitable. In practice, however, their fondness for coercive measures suggests that the 
union would not be wholly voluntary.  
COMPETING IDEAS FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS 
The strength of the appeal of these different groups is difficult to measure, since people's 
views cut across categories, often resulting in self-contradictory stands. This is especially 
true because superpower nostalgia, combined with heavy-handed tactical thinking, gives 
an imperialist tinge to many liberal and nationalist viewpoints. One poll found, for 
example, that only 11 percent of Russians believed Russia was still a great power, but 
two-thirds of them wanted Russia to regain great power status.21  
These widespread feelings cause an extreme sensitivity, even in liberal circles, to 
symbolic slights that impinge on Russian prestige. Thus, Russians react sharply when 
NATO acts against their Serb friends over their objections, or without their being 
consulted  less because their interests have been harmed than because their amour propre 
has been damaged. The result of Russian disappointment on such issues, as contrasted 
with a nostalgically viewed past, is a pervasive use of emotional language about how 
Russia has been "shamed," "humiliated," reduced to a "second-rate state," and so on. A 
common theme is for threats to Russian prestige to spark psychological denial  for 
example, the Russian government's persistent unwillingness to admit that Russia was the 
source of any of the radioactive materials smuggled to central Europe in the mid-1990s.22  
In this tangle of concerns, the politics of Russia's identity is by necessity a politics of 
competing attempts to synthesize competing concepts. One of the most popular of these 
attempts is the work of Gennady Zyuganov, the nationalist politician turned Communist 
Party leader who was Boris Yeltsin's chief opponent in the 1996 presidential election. 
Zyuganov's platform resurrects, in updated form, the old Tsarist synthesis of imperialism, 
Russian nationalism, and Russian Orthodox mysticism. As Zyuganov put it in one 
formulation, "Two basic values lie at the foundation of the Russian idea  Russian 
spirituality, which is inconceivable without an Orthodox Christian outlook and a 
realization of one's true purpose on Earth, and Russian statehood and great-power 
status."23 Zyuganov's idea of Russian nationalism is based on "language, culture," and "a 
unique type of civilization that inherited and developed a thousand-year long tradition of 
Kievan Rus,' Muscovy, the Russian Empire, and the USSR."24 Zyuganov clarifies the 
imperialist aspect of his ideology elsewhere, borrowing the "centrist" formulation: "the 
restoration of the union of the former Soviet peoples  based on voluntary association  [is] 
a historical necessity dictated by Russia's needs and those of world security."25  
Zyuganov's synthesis is, however, inherently unstable. He appeals to extreme nationalists 
because he is one of them, complete with a penchant for conspiracy theories: he claimed, 
for example, that reformers such as Anatoly Chubais are part of a Western conspiracy to 
destroy Russia.26 Zyuganov appeals to communist imperialists by praising Stalin and 
promising to reassemble the Soviet Union.27 But while the appeals to Russian spiritual 
culture and civilization may serve to bind ethnic Russians together, they hardly justify the 
imperialist mission. Furthermore, his claims that "Orthodox spirituality" includes "the 
traditions of tolerance and respect for neighboring peoples," especially Muslims, merely 
confuse the issue.28 Zyuganov's extremism is too clear for Muslims and Russian 
moderates to take such reassurance seriously, but his moderate rhetoric undermines his 
credibility with extremists.  
DANGERS OF THE YELTSIN TEAM'S SYNTHESIS 
Part of the explanation of Boris Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 election is that he offered, 
though he did not quite articulate, a concept of Russian national identity both more 
popular and more politically coherent than Zyuganov's. Yeltsin's trick has been to use 
selected bits of nationalist rhetoric and imperialist policy without entirely abandoning the 
original liberal foundations of Russian policy established by his first foreign minister, 
Andrei Kozyrev.  
Yeltsin's new synthesis begins with style. New Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
yields nothing to imperialists and nationalists in his assertion of "great power" status for 
Russia, forcefully asserting Russia's position on such issues as NATO expansion and 
arms control.29 Russia's avowed policy toward the CIS, furthermore, is overtly 
imperialist, stating that "matters must be driven toward the creation of a collective 
security system" and toward a "Customs Union" for all CIS states  with coercion 
implicitly among the driving forces.30 And Russia's treaty on political and economic 
integration with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan provides concrete evidence that the 
policy is not purely rhetorical.31 Indeed, one of Zyuganov's foreign policy aides 
"conceded that Yeltsin had already co-opted much of Zyuganov's foreign policy 
program."32  
Other Yeltsin policies are also imperialistic. Russia has facilitated if not organized coups 
in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan, replacing hostile nationalist leaders with former 
Politburo members (or, in Tajikistan, unreconstructed communists) who are more 
friendly to Russia. Russia has also exploited ethnic conflicts in neighboring states, 
providing the military power for Russian-speaking separatists to secede (at least de facto) 
from Moldova, and for the Abkhazians to escalate and win their long-running conflict 
with Georgia. There were also Russian troops fighting on both sides of the Armenian-
Azerbaijani dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.33 All this is in addition to the 
economic pressure and veiled threats used against other neighbors. Russia's heavy-
handed efforts to control Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's oil export routes exemplify this 
last policy.34  
The Slavophilic and nationalist tendencies in Russian policy also go beyond rhetoric. The 
category of "Russian-speaking" populations, which primarily includes Russians and 
Ukrainians, is a Slavophilic concept, though it is used to serve imperialist aims. The old 
Russian parliament's resolution that Crimea is Russian territory (as it legally was until 
1954) was a nationalist gesture. And the disputes with Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet 
are largely about the Slavophilic desire to pressure the balky Ukrainians into agreeing to 
military, political and economic reintegration with Russia.  
Yeltsin's appointment of General Alexander Lebed as his national security advisor further 
strengthened both his nationalist and his imperialist credentials. Lebed's fame comes 
from his period as commander of the Russian army that intervened in Moldova's civil 
war, making him a walking symbol of Russia's imperialist policies. And Lebed's 
nationalist rhetoric  opposition to the activities of foreign religions such as Mormonism, 
for example  strengthens his appeal with that constitutency.  
Yet even with all of these policies, core elements of the liberal approach also remain at 
the heart of Russian policy. Yeltsin's starting point, sincere if not unqualified, is "that 
only a democratic state system can ensure a suitable future for Russia," a commitment he 
proved by submitting to a free election.35 Acceptance of the internationally recognized 
borders of the Russian Federation remains a fundamental principle of Russian policy. 
Nationalist rhetoric and nationalist attacks have not prevented continuing cooperation 
with Western financial institutions. Russian pursuit of integration with the West has not 
stopped, and Yeltsin cites proudly Russian inclusion in the Council of Europe as a 
success of his policy. Finally, Russian policy has encouraged the employment of liberal 
civic criteria for citizenship both in Russia and the other former Soviet states. Even the 
relatively hard-line Primakov explicitly rejects the idea of re-establishing the Soviet 
Union, aiming primarily for economic reintegration.36  
Yeltsin's overall synthesis strikes a skillful balance between the divergent and often self-
contradictory preferences of Russian mass and elite opinion. As one survey showed, 
many liberal foreign-policy elites believe that Russia must democratize and integrate with 
the West economically, but also that Russian military intervention in other former Soviet 
states is legitimate;37 the Yeltsin government pursues both. On the other hand, polls 
consistently show most Russians are disinclined to use force in the former Soviet states,38 
so imperialist goals are more typically pursued by proxy, or with humanitarian cover as 
"peacekeeping" operations. One 1994 poll also showed that most Russians considered 
human rights, democracy and "good-neighbor relations" with CIS countries to be more 
important than re-establishment of the old Soviet borders.39 Pressure on CIS countries is 
therefore typically justified by appeal to such issues as human rights, especially for ethnic 
Russians, while "voluntary" reintegration  some of it genuinely voluntary  is pursued to 
establish "good-neighbor relations."  
Still, the Yeltsin synthesis is contradictory, and the contradiction creates a trap for 
Russian liberals. Wanting to give in to their own imperialist nostalgia  or to pander to 
others' nostalgia  they will often advocate Russian imperialist moves, such as military 
intervention in support of groups like Abkhazian separatists in neighboring Georgia. The 
trouble is that by doing so, they are leaving their principles, especially their principled 
opposition to chauvinism, undefended. Calling such intervention "peacekeeping" 
ultimately makes matters worse, since it means abandoning the real content of the 
peacekeeping idea, leaving Russia with the options of military expansion defined as 
peacekeeping, or no military action at all, in cases where real peacekeeping might be 
Russia's best choice.40  
It is this rivalry between imperial and humanitarian impulses  often in the same people  
which explains the uneven nature of Russian foreign policy. Russians who are attracted to 
imperial ideas, for example, are often repelled by the brutal means necessary to 
implement them  as they are learning in Chechnya. Liberal elites, as noted above, are 
simultaeously "Westernizers" and imperialists. And much of the Russian foreign policy 
debate is carried out on humanitarian grounds, with imperialists justifying their policies 
by appealing to the need to protect Russians abroad. The danger is that liberals will 
define away their core beliefs, or else that the imperialist dimension of Russian policy 
will create a foreign backlash which makes the pursuit of cooperative foreign policies 
impossible.  
CONTRADICTION IN ACTION IN MOLDOVA 
The Moldova case illustrates how all three ideological strands  Slavophilic, imperialist, 
and liberal  combine with cognitive bias to influence Russian policy. The justification for 
Russian policy is Slavophilic: Ukrainians and Russians together form a majority of 
"Russian speakers" in Moldova's Trans-Dniester region, and they were for a time subject 
to some ethnic discrimination, so Russia was naturally sympathetic. Russia's real policy 
goals, however, and the means it used, were imperialistic. The Trans-Dniestrians were 
able to launch a separatist war only because Moscow organized, armed, and funded 
them.41 When open war broke out in 1992, Russia's locally stationed troops, the 14th 
Army, intervened in the fighting to impose a ceasefire favoring the separatists. As the 
price of restraining the Trans-Dniestrians and the 14th Army from further attacks, Russia 
forced the reluctant (non-Slavic) Moldovans into joining the CIS. Yeltsin has also 
blocked the promised withdrawal of the 14th Army, since without the Army's protection 
the separatist Trans-Dniester region  Moscow's best source of leverage over Moldova  
would collapse. Imperialists also see the 14th Army's bases as a platform for extending 
Russian influence in the Balkans, and as leverage against Ukraine.  
But there is more to the story than this. Liberal Russians argue that they are merely 
defending their co-nationals' "human rights." Furthermore, they genuinely believe 
General Lebed, the former commander of the 14th Army, when he says that withdrawing 
the troops would lead to chaos or renewed war. And officially, Russian policy toward 
Moldova looks fairly liberal: Russia sent "peacekeepers" separate from the 14th Army to 
police the truce; and it has not recognized the self-proclaimed independence of the Trans-
Dniester, much less moved to annex it. One relatively liberal commentator even managed 
to convince himself that the Moldovan government really wants the 14th Army to stay in 
the region to maintain local stability, in spite of repeated Moldovan demands that it 
leave.42  
These claims are the result of what one might call honest cognitive distortion: the beliefs 
are mostly false, but they are genuinely held. To start with, the "peacekeepers" are not 
peacekeepers in the internationally understood sense of the word  they are partisan, not 
impartial. Russians can, of course, make the claim that their partisan "peacekeepers" have 
successfully kept the peace in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, while the UN's 
impartial ones failed in Bosnia and elsewhere. But more to the point, they simply cannot 
understand why Russian "peacekeeping" in Moldova or Abkhazia is considered 
imperialism in the West, while American peacekeeping in Somalia, or its invasion of 
Panama, is not. Convinced of their own goodwill, they overlook the fact that Russia 
caused the worst of the violence by arming the separatists in these areas, and that it now 
pursues its interests by preventing peaceful settlements of those disputes.  
FEAR AND NATO EXPANSION 
These cognitive distortions are important because they drive the security dilemmas now 
unsettling the eastern half of Europe. Russians, sensitive to the past excesses of 
nationalism in places like Moldova, refuse to believe that the conflict can be settled 
peacefully if they withdraw their troops. In fact, nowhere is the peaceful settlement of an 
ethnic conflict more likely than in Moldova; Russians do not know this because their 
media, including government-run television, has been distorted by a pervasive pro-
Dniestrian bias. Central European states, already sensitive to past Russian expansionism, 
react to this Russian interventionism so near their borders by clamoring to join NATO. 
Russians, in turn, react with fear and suspicion to the prospect of NATO's expansion to 
their border (Russia's Kaliningrad enclave shares a short border with Poland).  
Russians are not convinced by NATO assurances that the alliance is not aimed against 
them, mostly because this is a transparent lie: why else do the Central Europeans want to 
join? In a worst-case scenario for Russia, in which Poland and the Baltic states joined 
NATO, the Kaliningrad enclave would become a sort of reverse Berlin, with the Russian 
outpost surrounded by NATO territory. Furthermore, as one liberal Russian analyst has 
noted, an expanded NATO would represent a security threat to Russia even if it were not 
explicitly aimed against Russia, simply because it is a large nearby concentration of 
potentially hostile power  which was in fact hostile not long ago.43  
Other policy disagreements reinforce Russian perceptions that NATO is already hostile. 
Given their sympathy for the Serbs, their fellow Orthodox Christians and (according to 
Russian nationalist mythology) their historical allies, few Russians can accept that the 
Serbs may be the aggressors in the former-Yugoslav conflict. Again, distortions in the 
Russian media are partly to blame. But the result of these and similar perceptions is that 
most Russians see Western opposition to the Serbs as blind hostility. Polls show that 
most Russians believe cooperation with the West is possible and desirable; but a majority 
sees current Western policy as aimed at "turning Russia into a colony."44  
THE WRONG SIGNALS 
The effect of Western policy on Russia's future foreign policy orientation can only be at 
the margin. Just as German aggression before 1945 was rooted in Germany's militarist 
ideology, and was tamed only by the Federal Republic's liberalism, so Russian aggression 
is rooted in Russia's identity-driven imperialism, and can be tamed only by the victory of 
liberalism in Russia. Western behavior matters, but only in the degree to which it 
supports the arguments of one side or the other in the Russian debate. Essentially, 
Russian liberals argue that expansionism will harm Russian interests while cooperation 
with the West will further those interests. Imperialists and nationalists argue, in contrast, 
that cooperation with the West cannot aid Russia, while expansion is a vital Russian 
interest.  
To date, Western policy toward Russia has too often supported the anti-liberal arguments. 
The West's appalling performance in 1992-93, repeatedly promising economic aid for 
Russia's reforms without delivering the sorts of aid needed most, seriously undermined 
the credibility both of Western promises and of pro-Western Russian liberals. Russia 
withdrew its troops from the Baltic states, but failed to gain Western support for 
guarantees of civil rights (such as voting and citizenship rights) for ethnic Russians in 
Estonia and Latvia. For several years, Russia generally complied with the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, but was unable to gain agreement on modifications it 
considered necessary. Finally, Russia simply refused to observe the disputed "flank 
requirement," whereupon the US simply accepted most of the Russian demands without 
extracting a quid pro quo. Meanwhile, Russia has paid essentially no price in the West 
for its interventions in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and elsewhere: even its 
savaging of Chechnya elicited hardly a peep from the West. Given this Western track 
record, it is reasonable for Russians to conclude that cooperation with the West does not 
pay, while expansionism and assertiveness do.  
The tough line against Russia now being promoted by US conservatives would 
exacerbate this situation. Reacting primarily to the aggressive elements in Russian 
foreign policy, these neo-hawks argue for tough responses, such as reductions in aid to 
Russia, to punish Russian brutality in Chechnya. Some reaction is called for, but a 
primarily punitive approach offers little positive if Russian policy changes. Thus, instead 
of supporting the Russian liberals' arguments, a hard-line policy would suggest that the 
imperialists and nationalists are right: cooperation with the West offers no benefits to 
Russia. Calls such as Zbigniew Brzezinski's for an expanded NATO and "geopolitical 
pluralism" in the former Soviet space  the worst nightmare of Russian strategic thinkers  
seem to confirm the impression. Brzezinksi would offer Russia participation in upgraded 
European security institutions, but this hardly compensates: Russians fully understand the 
weakness of such institutions, so the offer looks more to them like bait in a trap designed 
to isolate Russia still further.45  
Western liberals' suggestions for primary reliance on international institutions and 
collective security agreements have the opposite flaw. As the failure of the League of 
Nations  and of the UN in Bosnia  should have taught us, institutionalized collective 
security arrangements are unreliable at best: countries try to "pass the buck," since 
determined action is always inconvenient, and aggressors can stymie the counteraction of 
organizations of which they are members.46 For these reasons, the limited involvement of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in places like Moldova 
has failed to address the central cause of Moldova's division  Moscow's military 
involvement. When Russian clients are not inclined to compromise, Russian 
"peacekeepers" merely provide a smokescreen behind which to consolidate gains from 
aggression. Thus liberal policies alone do not refute the Russian imperialists' suggestion 
that expansionism is easy and cheap.  
HOW TO HELP RUSSIA'S LIBERALS 
Boris Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 Russian election does not guarantee the victory of a 
liberal concept of Russia's identity. As noted above, Yeltsin's policies are heavily tinged 
with nationalism and imperialism, and they could move further in that direction. If 
Western policy is to help arrest that trend and support the case of the Russian liberals, it 
will have to take Russia's interests more seriously, and offer effective cooperative routes 
for Russia to pursue them. At the same time, aggressive Russian moves will have to be 
met with a firmer response than has been forthcoming to date.  
One modest route to promoting cooperative security policies in Europe would be for the 
Council of Europe to take a more understanding position regarding the interests of the 
Russian minority in the Baltic states. Estonian or Latvian policy toward ethnic Russians 
is occasionally heavy-handed and discriminatory, and a more sympathetic international 
stance would lessen Russia's need to rely solely on heavy-handed unilateral measures in 
response. Similarly, Western countries should mobilize institutions such as OSCE and the 
UN to protect the populations of the Trans-Dniester region and Abkhazia, in order to 
deprive Russia of its justification for intervention in those regions. If Russia agreed to 
remove its troops from the Trans-Dniester and Abkhazia, the troops could be replaced at 
Western expense by mutually agreeable peacekeepers.  
The review conference on the CFE Treaty presents another opportunity. American 
concessions to Russia's demands to revise the treaty's "flank" force limits were probably 
premature, but they did have the positive effect of reassuring Russia that its views and 
concerns are taken seriously, providing it with a much-desired diplomatic victory 
(soothing Russians' aching self-image) at limited cost to the West. Still, the conference 
might provide an opportunity for some horse-trading on related issues: formalizing the 
American concessions might be made contingent on Russian recognition of its 1920 
treaties with Estonia and Latvia, for example. Alternatively, Russia might be pushed to 
reduce its forces in the Kaliningrad region (a boon for the Baltic states and Poland) in 
return for changes in the status of the Russian minority in the Baltic states.  
Furthermore, the very process of negotiations would help the Russian government 
reassert civilian control over its military. Especially early on, the assertiveness of the 
Russian military in the "near abroad" was the result not only of Russian government 
policy, but also of the preferences of poorly controlled Russian armies or their 
commanders. Formal, long-term negotiations on political-military issues could help, 
forcing Russia to create institutions capable of making trade-off decisions and imposing 
them on military loose cannons. During the SALT I negotiations, for example, the Soviet 
Union created a special high-level arms control commission that provided a forum in 
which some military interests (e.g., the Air Defense Forces' desire to build an anti-
ballistic missile system) were sacrificed to Brezhnev's desire for a "peace offensive."47 
New CFE negotiations might have a similar effect, confronting the Russian government 
with a reason to assert more effective civilian control over its army.  
Indeed, given the reviving concern in Russia about American ballistic missile defense 
programs, formal negotiations about revisions to the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
might also be appropriate. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the rising 
ABM capability of American air defense weapons (such as the Navy's Aegis system) 
probably require some adjustment of the ABM Treaty in any case, and discussing such 
adjustments with Russia is far preferable to scrapping the treaty altogether, as some 
American conservatives have proposed. Conducting the negotiations would also 
contribute to improving Russia's civilian control over the military.  
Side by side with these cooperative initiatives, NATO must also do more to raise the cost 
to Russia of aggressive policies, especially in the other former Soviet states. The key 
distinction Western countries must make is between Russian interventions which help 
resolve their neighbors' conflicts, and interventions which prevent conflict resolution but 
help Russia gain political leverage. Russia's policy of subsidizing and protecting 
intransigent separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Dniestr region are in the 
latter category, and the West should step up diplomatic pressure on Russia to promote 
genuine conflict resolution attempts in those areas. Certainly the record of Russian 
mendacity in these conflicts is an international issue: Russia has broken promises to 
withdraw troops from Moldova, to apply sanctions against Abkhazia, and so on, raising 
serious issues about Russian credibility in international negotiations. Since the lies have 
to date been cost-free, however, Russia continues to proffer them, most blatantly in 
Chechnya, where Russian ceasefire agreements have been worthless. If diplomatic 
pressure does not suffice to change such Russian policies, NATO could step up the 
pressure in other ways. It could, for example, begin offering security assistance for 
Georgia or Moldova through the Partership for Peace.  
NATO expansion is also available as a threat, but it ought to be carried out only as a last 
resort. Since NATO expansion into East-Central Europe is ipso facto a threat to Russian 
security, an early decision to proceed with it would decisively undermine efforts at 
promoting cooperative security policy in Europe. Once Russians learn that they cannot 
avert NATO expansion through cooperation, they will feel a need to respond by creating 
a countervailing coalition, probably by coercing their CIS partners even more. But if 
NATO expansion is postponed, and its possibility maintained as a threat to stop Russian 
expansionism, the Russian liberals' hand would be strengthened. As quoted above, some 
Russian liberals argue that Russia can avoid NATO expansion by being more cooperative 
with the West; only by postponing expansion can NATO show that their argument is 
valid.  
This does not mean "giving the Russians a veto" on NATO's membership, since the 
postponement of NATO expansion would be conditional on cooperative Russian 
behavior. If the Russians can be persuaded to restrain themselves, the Partnership for 
Peace would offer the best balance of reassurance to both Russia and the Central 
Europeans. Early NATO expansion, in contrast, would quickly result in increased 
security threats for everyone. Postponement, therefore, is not capitulation to Russia, but 
the frank pursuit of NATO's  and Central and Eastern Europe's  best interests.  
Another crucial issue for Russia is economic integration, both in the East and between 
East and West. The Russians are not merely being imperialistic when they argue for the 
economic re-integration of the former Soviet space: the inefficiencies of Soviet-era trade 
notwithstanding, the former Soviet states still conduct most of their trade with each other, 
so economic cooperation among them could aid enormously in their recovery.48 One way 
for the West to promote such re-integration would be to make future economic aid to the 
CIS states, including aid from multilateral institutions, contingent on their economic 
cooperation with each other. The greatest flaw of the economic aid packages offered to 
CIS states by the West was the neglect of one of the great successes of the Marshall Plan: 
compelling the plan's participants to cooperate, and integrate their economies. Such a 
measure, if handled delicately, is most of all a carrot to Russia, since it would make clear 
that the West does not oppose such economic cooperation, and does not oppose the 
exercise of Russian influence in areas obviously of vital interest to Russia  as long as that 
exercise is benign.  
A related interest, shared by all of the former communist states, is access to markets in 
the European Union and North America. Political stability (and resistance to the national 
chauvinist virus) is dependent on economic growth, and economic growth is dependent 
largely on success in generating exports. The countries of the developed North have 
gotten away for decades with excluding inconvenient imports from the Third World 
because the security consequences of that exclusion were remote, both in time and space. 
The security consequences of continuing the same policy toward the eastern half of 
Europe will be more immediate.  
Ultimately, the solution to the Russian Problem is in the hands of Russians. Russia's 
democratic tradition is weak, but its humanitarian and moralistic traditions are strong, and 
those traditions make a liberal solution to the Russian Problem possible. The imperialistic 
aspects of Russian policy are attributable more to superpower nostalgia than to a real 
dominance of imperialist ideology in Russia. The task for the West is to deter and oppose 
Russian aggression, while energetically pursuing cooperative solutions to Russia's 
economic and security problems. In short, the West can do no more than maintain 
balance in its own policies, and hope that balance helps Russia find its own.  
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